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THE :t-P.OBLEf1 IN GE?l1ANY

The problem which confronts us in Germany is a segment
of the world-wide problem of establishing equitable, rational and
evolving, conditions of peace.

Today the crisis looms in a di-

vided Germany and a divided Berlin.

Tomorro't'T the scene of princi-

pal danger may shift to the Hiddle East.

The day after it could

be in the Far East that the clouds of conflict gather.
Since the end of the second war we have lived l'lith a
succession of international crises in these and other regions
of the globe.
ous mine.

It is as though the world were a vast and danger-

We have rushed from one point of imminent or actual

cave-in to another in a never-ending struggle to shore up the
sagging roof of peace.

He have timbered t-1ith a Berlin airlift,

with a military defense of South Korea, with vast aid-programs
in Europe, Asia and elset·There,

to~ith

troops in Lebanon and with

naval p0\'7er and other measures in the Formosan Straits.
These costly and strenuous improvisations represent
our efforts to prevent a complete collapse of peace.

It is

doubtful, however, that what these measures have produced in
the principal zones of danger--in Germany and Central Europe,
in the Middle East and in Asia--this patcht-1orlc of timbering on
~1hich

the fate of civilization rests--t-lould meet a minimum

safety code.

The fact is that a dangerous world, no less than

a dangerous mine, is not made safer, in any permanent sense, by
patchwork.

Improvisations may be unavoidable, as interim meas-

ures, as desperate measures.

They ought not to be confused,
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however, with peace.

Cn the contrary, improvisations may con-

ceal an encroaching danger to ourselves and to the rest of the
~~orld

by creating the illusion of stability, by permitting the

postponement of essential, fundamental changes until it becomes
perilously late to make them.
Something of that sort, I believe, lies at the root
of the present problem :..n

Ge~"'ttlany.

For years nO't'l, there has

existed in that nation a kind of surface stability.
This is the appearance of that stability.

In Uestern

Germany 't1hich houses about SO million Germans, the responsible,
representative government of the Federal Republic, its capital
in the city of
ness.

Bonn,funct~ons

with a high degree of effective-

West Germany has one of the most productive and dynamic

industrial economies in the

~'lorld .

It also has the substantial

beginnings of a pm·1erful German military establishment.

Beside

this establishment, there are garrisoned over 275,000 other NATO
troops--French,

Br~tish

and American--many with their dependents.

To the East of the Federal Republic is a communistheld German territory, much smaller in area and with a population of only 17 millions.

Many Germans regard this region not

as East Germany but as Central Germany, having in mind the Polishannexed territories beyond the Oder-Neisse as the true, the unredeemed East.

For our purposes tonight,

ho~.o1ever,

of the region as East Germany or Communist Germany.

I shall speak
In this

sector of the divided nation, there is poverty, stagnation and
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oppression from which vast numbers have fled to the Pest in
recent years.

Increasingly, however, we hear reports of plans,

if not the beginning, of an economic revival in the East.
There is

communist rule in Eastern Germany.

A

German totalitarian regime exists there by virtue of its own
and Soviet po't'Ter and the acquiescence, ho'ttlever sullen, of the
East German people.

As in the Hest, a German military establish-

ment has been reconstituted in the East, under communist control.
It is supplemented by many divisions of Soviet Russian troops.
This brief sketch of a divided Germany also fits in
microcosm, with some variations, the present situation in a
divided Berlin.

A princ ipal difference is that Allied and

Soviet Russian forces still retain tangible, visible responsibility for what happens, respectively, in the Hestern and Eastern sectors of the city.

Garrisons of both are present and the

Russians control the routes through East Germany over which
French, British and American forces must pass, from their bases
in Hest Germany to their outpost in Berlin.
Under the ultimate control of the Allies, Hest Berlin
has its o'tm municipal govel.'llment 't'lith trTillie Brandt as its able,
outspoken Hayor.

Under Soviet control, a sector of East Berlin--

Pankow--serves as the seat of the Communist East German regime.
P..mong Germans of the
and the

blo

t~'lo

zones of the divided nation

parts of Berlin there is a considerable contact,

official and unofficial, in trade and in other matters.

There

is no formal recognition, however, of the one by the other.

In
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fact, of all the pri nci pal countries involved i n ti1e Ge::man
situation only the Sovi et Union recognizes both the \-Jest and
East German governments.
That, in bri ef, i s the look of stabi lity i n Germany.
,•'

The arrangements which

underp ~n

this stability are t hose which

evolved at the end of vJorld l•J ar II.

They were des i gned origi-

nally for the temporary occupation of a defeated Germany.

But

what began as an expedi ent took on a ki nd of permanence with
the breakdown in relations bett·reen the Soviet Uni on and t h e
Western nations.
All around the r im of Germany changes have taken
place.

vJithi n Hest Germany and East Germany, res pecti vely,

changes have also taken place.

But bet'\'leen the div i s i ons, the

arrangements for stabi l i ty have not changed i n essentials for
years.
All of the nati ons i nvolved have recogni zed at one
t i me or another that these arrangements are i na dequate.

He

and other Hestern nati ons have sai d, i n effect, that they must
be changed.
changed.
later they

The Soviet Union has admitted that they should be

The German leaders-- East and
~1ill

be changed .

t~Jest-- knmv

that sooner or

All i nvolved have paid at least lip

service to the bas i c requi rements of change, that is, to the need
for reuni ficat i on of Germany and of i ts capital of Berli n and to
the need for a final liqui dati on of '(IJorld vJar II.

- 5 However, no nation has really moved from the pos i tion
it assumed years ago on how these admi ttedly necessary changes
should be brought about.

The Hestern position has been based)

at least until recently, on the contention that there should be
free all-German elections as the prerequisite to reuni fication
and a peace settlement.

The Russians have been vague on this

matter but it is apparent that even if they use the same language
as we do, they do not mean the same thi ngs.

They clearly do not

accept a unification of Germany by free all-German elections, if
it means, as it 't'Tould at this time, the obliteration of German
communist political influence in East Germany.

It may be that

they are not really prepared to accept unificati on under any
circumstances unless it means the dominati on of all of Germany
by communism.
In the meantime, all have managed to live with the
existi ng arrangements, wi th a di vided Germany and Berlin, part
free and part communist, with a Germany no longer at war but
not yet fully at peace.

On only two occasions have these arrange-

ments been seriously challenged.

They were h i t by the Stalin-

imposed blockade of Berlin ::n 1948.

Then, i n 1953, the com-

munist political structure i n East Germany was shaken by worker
uprisings.

Both attempts, as you know, failed.

The vJestern

nations committed enormous resources in the Berli n airli ft and
in the supply and reconstruction of West Berlin.
Stalin

~·Tas

Finally,

persuaded to abandon hi s attempt to force us from

- 6 the city and to unify it under communist control.

The East

German revolt which we supported with very articulate enthusiasm
was suppressed by Soviet military power and the hope of a spontaneous unification of all Germany under freedom, in that fashion, 'tias set back.
Si nce 1953, the status quo has not again been subjected to a major test anywhere in Germany.

To be sure, there

have been incidents which have sent tremors through the stability
but they did not upset it.

Just last November, for example, Mr.

Khrushchev warned that he tiould change the status quo at Berlin.
He did not schedule the execution of the change, however, until
this month.

Now, apparently, it has been postponed, pending the

results of the coming conferences.
In short, the German s i tuation is sti ll held together

by the same provisional, improvised arrangements which have held
it together for years.

These arrangements are tied to certain

basic conditions, conditi ons which must prevail if the stability
in Germany, in its present form, is to continue.
clearly what these

cond~ions

He must see

are if we are to measure the scope

of the problem which confronts us.

Let me, the"Lefore, outline

them at this point.
First, the present stabi lity in Germany depends upon
the absence of decisive accidents or provocat i ons between the
military forces of the vlest and the Soviet Union.

It is conceiv-

able that there may be hostile or threatening contact between

- 7 these forces, as i ndeed there has been, l7i thout a col lapse.
This contact, however, cannot go too far.

At some undetermined

point, mi litary accidents or provocations are l i kely to set off
a chain reaction which

~Till

engage i.n a decisive fashion the

prestige--the face, so to speak--of the princi pal pott7ers.

At

that point the irrevocabl e slide or plunge i nto the abyss of
war

~rlll

have begun.
That, then, is one condition of the conti nuance of

the status quo in Germany, of the present stability which is
nei ther peace nor \'lar.

There must be an absence of hostile

accidents or provocations betwe en the military forces in Germany
which go beyond the poi nt of no return.
The second condition is German acquiescence, the

acqui escence of the people of the East as well as the West in
the systems under whi ch they

nov1

l i ve.

Let me say, parentheti-

cally at thi s poi nt that I do not suggest that this i s desirable.
I merely say that it is one of the factors which underlie the
existing

stability ~

As

a part of acguiescence 2 Germans must be willing

to accept the conti nued di v i sion of their country, the continued
presence of foreign troops in great numbers in their land and
the military arrangements whi ch join one segment of the nation
to NATO for protection and subordinate the other to the t>Iarsaw
Pact.

n

-

u

-

The third basic condition of

~he ~tatus

quo is that

the Hestem powers and the Soviet Union must also tolerate the
existing

div~sion

of Germany and the present arrangements for

occupation of a divided Berlin.

In short, if the German people

must accept the status quo, the T·!estem Pm·1 ers and the Soviet
Union must not challenge it, at least they must not challenge
it with anything much stronger than words.

Further, the peoples

of the l•J est must be prepared, as must the people of the communist
bloc to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establishments
and the instruments of cold war which are made necessary in part
by the existing arrangements for keeping the status quo in Germany.
In stating these conditions, I emphasize again that I
do not advocate them or subscribe to their desirability.

I

merely note them as underlying the present situation in Germany,
as the conditions precedent to its continuance.

These conditions

are not the foundations of an equitable, rational and evolving
peace in Germany and Central Europe.
timbering of an improvised truce.

They are the patchwork

Nevertheless, they are the

conditions on which the lives of the German people, the people
of Europe and, in a larger sense, the survival of a recognizable
human civilization not-1 depend.
If one of these conditions is changed in any significant fashion, I cannot see that the present situation in Germany
is likely to persist.

It seems to me that it must either evolve

into something more durable or it will collapse ;n the chaos of
of war, limited or unlimited.

- 9 Putting as ide for a moment r1r. Khrushchev's announcement that he proposes to alter one of the conditions of the present stability, that is, the arrangement at Berlin, what of
others?

Can these others, in any event, be counted upon to sup-

port indefinitely the
can be.

e~dsting

situation?

I do not see how they

I believe that these other conditions have already

changed markedly beneath the surface calm, that they are continuing to change and that they cannot change much more before the
churning shall break through the surface.
In that sense, I am persuaded that the present stability in Germany t-tas in the process of erosion long before 1'1r.
~1rushchev's

announcement last November.

Indeed, I said so in

the Senate many months prior to that time.
Let us look for a moment at the present state of these
conditione of stabil:1.ty, these basic conditions which must prevail if there is to be no change in the German situation.
the first--that there must be no mi litaEY

acc~dent

or provocation

in Germany which goes beyond the point of no return.
obvious that none, so far, has done so.
grave near-misses.

~s

The Berlin Blockade was a massive near-miss.

I need not catalogue them.
a~ain--to

It

But there have been

Since that time there have been other incidents,

and

Take

provocat~ons.

You have seen reference to them time

the buzzed transports, to the challenged convoys,

to the downed planes and the detained soldiers.

! do not know

which of these incidents may have been prompted by higher Soviet
headquarters and which may have come about by the whim of some
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local commander.

Given a concucive

se~_ ?f c ircums tances~?~

ever, it is far from inconcei vable that any

~nc ~dent

of this

k:.ncl mi.ght go out of control.
Apart from deli berate provocation,

the~e

sti.ll remains

the very real danger of military accident, if not on our £art,
then on tDeirs.

The chances of accident multiply when forces

are poised--as they are in Germany--at swords-point and are
keyed tight by the electrified atmosphere of cold war, of propaganda war.

They multiply agai n as the countdowns of the new

weapons quicken and their delivery times shorten.

They multiply

sti ll agai n as these devices of incredible devastation find their
way into more and more hands.

In this sense 1 then 1 a basic pre-

condition of the status guo i n Germany has indeed changed, quite
apart from any recent change in Soviet policy wi th respect to
Berlin.

It has changed in the sense that the margin for mili-

tary error or provocation has narrowed.

The prospects are 1

moreover, that the margi n will narrm-1 still further as time goes

I believe, too, that it i s reasonable to suggest that
the acqui escence of the Germans--East and West--the second basic
condition on which the status quo rests, has also changed significantly and will continue to change.

It is, of course, diffi-

cult to document the sentiment of a 1;-1hole people.
formed,

ho~1ever,

East Germany.

He are in-

that there is great une:K pressed discontent in

We know, moreover, that there are movements for

reunification and neutralization in Western Germany, even if we
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cannot measure their strength.

He must assume that curxents of a

similar and probably stronger kind flow through East Germany even
though Mr. Gallup has yet to conduct a poll in that region.
It is obvious that the defeated Germany, the disarmed
Germany, the shattered, starving Germany for which the present
improvised arrangements of stability t'lere devised, no longer
exists.

As I noted earlier in my remarks, at least in one zone--

in the West--there is a revitalized nation.

Furthe~~ore,

in both

zones, there now exist German military forces and political structures manned by Germans, even if, in the East, they may not be
controlled ultimately by Germans.

In both zones, finally, a new

generation is coming into its own--a generation which w·as young
in the days of defeat but which, now and in the years immediately
ahead, will inevitably rise to leadership in Germany.

In these

circumstances, it would be unrealistic in the extreme to believe
that the arrangements for stability which exist in Germany--devised in another hour and for another setting and modified only
within each zone separately--will continue to serve for the indefinite future.

In short, we must face the likelihood that the

second condition of the status quo--the continued acquiescence
of the German people in division and quasi-occupation may well
be

dra~ling

to an end.

lrJe must reckon with the strong possibility

that, increasingly, Germans will seek their unity and national
e~uality

by whatever means may be available if constructive ma-

chinery to facilitate it in peace and order does not exist.

- lL. As for the third basic condi tion on

't·Jh ~

c'1 t!1e ..E,_resent

stability in Germany rests, I have already noted that if

'tole

are

to go on as we are, the Western nations and the Soviet Union
must not challenge the exi sting arrangements with anything much
ocs:asional
stronger than 't'lords. In fact, except fog dangerous but limited
military incidents and provocations, neither has challenged it,
in any other fashion in recent years.

Further I said that both

the people of the Hestern nations and the Soviet Union must be
willing to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establishments and the instruments of cold war to keep a rough eq_uilibrium
of force not only in Germany but throughout the world.

That,

too, has been done until now, although I 't·lOuld be less than
honest if I did not

e~press

my deep concern over continuing re-

ports that the Soviet effort in this respect is greater than our
~·

I am not in a pos i t ion to evaluate those reports.

The of-

ficial secrecy--necessary and unnecessary--which engulfs this
question cannot be easily penetrated by Members of Congress.
The disqui eting reports, hm·1ever ~ come from highly qualified
and competent sources and they do not auger well for the future.
They certai nly raise doubts about the likeli hood of maintaining
the present stability in Germany or

an~~here

else for that matter.

Finally, the third condi tion of the status quo also
depends upon the maintenance of the present arrangements at
Berlin.

vJe now know that these arrangements have been challenged.

Mr. Khrushchev has assailed the Western pos i tion i n Berlin and
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demanded that it change.

He has done so, hm-1ever, only in words

and, in that respect, his challenge is not new.
tfuat is new, what does threaten the status quo is the
strange action by which Mro I<hrushchev proposes to bring about
this change.

He proposes to withdraw himself from Berlin, that

is, he says that he will remove Soviet forces from the city and
from the routes of access to it.
equally strange.

Our offic ial answer has been

We have said, in effect, that the Russians

cannot leave the city and the routes of access, that they certainly cannot leave it in spirit and perhaQS not even in body.
After trying for many years to get the Russians out of the areas
into which they sprat·l led after Horld

'tt1ar

II, here is one place

that we do not wish them to leave.
The reason for this is clear.
Berlin, they will turn over the
German communists.

If the Russians do quit

inst~~ents

of control to East

That opens, for the Soviet Union, a large

field of manoeuvre in the war of nerves.

But in a more funda-

mental sense, the action will also work a change in the underlying conditions of the status quo in Germany.

It will increase

the strains and stresses on the essential military restraints
which are a part of the present stabi l i ty.

It will do the same

to German acquiescence which is also a part of i t.

In short,

the entire German situation will move into a peri od of grave
instability out of t'lhich is likely to emerge either a new status
quo or conflict.

-

ll~

-

There has been a great deal of speculat:'.Oi.l on "1hy
Mr . Khrushchev has threatened to ta!<e

th~s

step .

Cne may as-

sume, of course, that Mr . :<hrushchev has been motivated by what
he believes 't·l ill be ultimately to the advantage of the Soviet
Union and world communism .
motivated by what

~~e

! would hope that we are equally

believe to be to the advantage of the

United St attes and to "t'lorld freedom.
~fuat

is significant at this moment, is not so much

the ultimate aims of Soviet communism.

He know what they are

and it is of little value to i ntone them again and again as
though this litany will somehow protect us from them.

Here

significant is the question of hm·7 t1r. l<hrushchev proposes to
serve communist interests through Soviet policies at a moment
in history

~1hen

the transcendent interests of civilization, and

of the human species i tself, rest in delicate balance
survival and nuclear

be~-1een

obl~teration.

No one who is not pr::vy to the operations of Nr.
r<hrushchev 1 s mind and the inner 't·m rldng of the mach:!.nery of
Soviet communism can be certain of what U.es beneath the Soviet
manoeuvre at Berlin.

The move could have been motivated by a

combinat::on of any of a score of reasons, some logi cal, some
" 11og:~.ca_,
. 1
1.

•
some grop2.ng
tm-1ard s peace, some stumo• 1":...ng towar d s

war.
The interpretation of the charades of Sov::et policy
may be a fascinating game.

As I have already noted, however,

this game ::s essenti ally speculative.

tfua t seems to

~e

most

- 15 important at this point :!.s not to guess at t he
of the Soviet mi nd but rather to get clearly

con-tents

o ~n ci.:.i:e

~n

our

o~m

minds

'1:·7hat it is that 't'le--the lr!es tern nati ons--seek i n this situat:f.on.
tfuat is most important is to make certai n that
reasonably related to the situation that
day, not to one
have

ex~sted

~1hich

't-7e woulc.

1~1~e

e~c is ts

\·7~1at

't'le s eek is

i n Germany to-

to exis t or one v-1h:!.ch may

years ago and no longer exists.

If the interests of this nation, of freedom and of
human c i v ilization lay only i n maintaining

ex~sting

arrangements

i n Germany, if Mr . l<hrushchev's manoeuvre at Berli n were the only
t hreat to these arrangements then, i ndeed, it
to counter that manoeuv.ce merely by

11

Is that, however, the case?

~10uld

be sufficient

standing finn.:.
I think it is clear that

f'lr . I<hrushchev 1 s manoeuv.ce at Berli n is not the only danger to

the status quo in Germany.

Further, I question "t>Thether an ef-

fort to maintain that status quo i ndefi nite ly is , in fact, in
accord wita the interests of t his nation, freecom and human
c i vilization.
To be sure, "t'le shall "stand firm" at
Germany.

and i n

I know of no responsible person in the government of

this nation who holds
wise.

Ber l:~.n

Horeover, I

othe~~i se.

lmm~

who holds otherwise.

I certainly do not hold other-

of no statesman in the Hes tern world

We shall stand firm because to permit

the forces of freedom to be frightened, cajoled or driven from
Berlin--the future capital of all Germany--will be to remove

- lS -

one of the props of the

p~esent

stability in that country before

another firmer support is in place.

Let us not, hm.,.ever, con-

fuse the necessity for standing firm i n that sense with a mere
maintenance of present arrangements in Germany for the indefinite future.
I am not persuaded that the interests of this nation,
of freedom and of human civilization

l~e

in an indefinite con-

tinuance of the present military situation in Berlin and in
Germany, a situation which, increasingly, will permit an accident
or an irresponsible local provocation to precipitate the suicide
of civilization.

I am not persuaded that these interests are

served by perpetuating arrangements in Germany which offer little prospect of progress tm-1ards peaceful unification to the
German people.

I am not persuaded that these interests are

served by the ever-mounting costs of the arms rivalry of the
cold 't'lar, and the propaganda 't'lar- -costs t-lhich are occasioned in
great part by the existing situation in Germany.
:fuat I am trying to suggest, in short, is that it is
not enough, in

ou~

own interests, merely to stand fast in Ger-

many, as an end in itself .

It :i.s not enough merely to seek to

sustain an existing situation which is ceasing to be adequate
for minimum stability in Germany and Central Europe.

Rather,

we must stand fast in order to go forward, in order to establish
more equi table, rational and evolving conditions of peace.
That is the challenge of the impendi ng conferences on
Germany.

We must strive in them, it seems to me, to create a

- 17 less volatile situation in Berlin, not merely by changi?g the
Western position in that city as the Russians have suggested
but perhaps by altering the status of the entire city, by internationalizing all Berlin under United Nations or other satisfactory international auspices as an interim arrangement.

We must

seek a readjustment of the military situation in all of Germany
and Central Europe in a fashion which promises to reduce the
danger of war by accident or provocation. vle must seek, finally,
full
a beginning on the spread o~political freedom throughout Germany and on German unification and, to that end, we must enlist
in far greater measure than heretofore, the participation of the
Germans themselves--East and t·1est.
I realize, fully, that 'tie shall not get
negct~ations

in

the~.r

to these ends if the

~ussians

an~1here ~-1ith

are not of a mind,

otm interest, to move :;.,n a similar direction.

have said, I do not presume to

~tnow

As I

the contents of the Soviet

mind at this time, nor do I lmm-1 of anyone who does .

I do ltnow

that regardless of Russian intentions we shall not begin to move
towards these ends unless we ourselves are clear as to where it
is we \'lant to go.

He require at tl;.is point in t::.me, beyond all

else, a frank recognition oi the importance of a change in Germany, a chanze not in the manner expounded by the
not
ago.

necessar~ly

~ussians

and

in the manner first projected by ourselves years

Rather 2 we need a change which conforms to the realities

of the present, a change brought about by concessions which match
concessions.

To this taslc, we --all the t·J estern nations--must

bring a new dedication, a new determination to develop equitable,
durable and evolving conditions of peace.

